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ABSTRACT
In her book, Free Time, Julie Rose argues that all citizens must be understood 
to have a claim to a fair share of free time. In the first part of this essay, I 
outline Rose’s theory of free time and explain why her discussion should be 
regarded as an important advance on existing thinking about the 
requirements of liberal egalitarian justice. In the second part of the essay, 
I argue that reflection on Rose’s conception of free time will force liberal 
egalitarians to confront some potentially troubling philosophical 
questions. These questions can be brought out by asking, first, how much 
free time people from different economic classes in fact have according to 
Rose’s conception, and, second, how much free time people belonging to 
different economic classes should have according to this conception. 
Reflecting on these questions, I argue that the idea that all citizens have a 
claim to a fair share of free time does not support giving seemingly harried 
yet already wealthy professionals the benefit of more flexible work 
schedules, generous caregiver leave, or more humane overtime rules. The 
reason is that such people must be judged to already have their fair shares 
of free time. This fact is an indication of a significant economic class divide, 
which liberal egalitarians must now somehow take into account.
Keywords:  free time; leisure; work; distributive justice; freedom; affluence; 
class
1. INTRODUCTION
Many people today complain about being overworked. According to Julie 
Rose, the harried professionals, working parents, and others who make this 
complaint may well have a point. In her new book, Free Time, Rose argues that, 
in a liberal society, citizens have a claim to more than merely the standard 
package of formal opportunities and liberal rights. In addition, every adult 
citizen should be understood to have a claim to a fair share of free time. 
Moreover, to ensure that everyone gets his or her fair share, it is not enough to 
attend to the distribution of income and wealth. After all, even a generous 
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wage subsidy will do a “time poor” single parent little good if she will be fired 
summarily for refusing overtime work. Similarly, a disabled person might be 
able to earn plenty of money working thirty-five hour weeks, yet his special 
needs may take up the rest of his waking hours unless he is able to find reliable 
in-home help. Accordingly, to ensure that each and every person gets a fair 
share of discretionary “hours for what we will,” the state must attend to the 
distribution of free time as well.
More precisely, if everyone’s fair share of free time is, say, eight hours per 
day, then, according to Rose, public policy must ensure the following four 
things (Rose 2016: 135). First, it must ensure that each person can actually 
meet his basic needs in sixteen hours per day. Second, it must make it so that 
each person can choose to spend no more than sixteen hours per day doing 
the things objectively required to meet his basic needs. Third, it must ensure 
that each person is normally able to meet his basic needs in no more than 
sixteen hours per day while working in the occupation of his choice. Finally, 
public policy must ensure that some of the free time that each person has each 
week is not merely uninterrupted but also shared with a substantial number 
of others. Otherwise, argues Rose, the freedom of association and cognate 
basic liberties of citizenship will threaten to become substantially less 
valuable to citizens or, at the limit, will be rendered worthless.
In defense of these claims, Rose puts forward a new conception of free time 
as a distinct object of distributive justice. In the first part of this essay, I will 
outline Rose’s theory of free time and explain why her discussion constitutes 
a major advance on existing thinking. In the second part of the essay, I will 
argue that reflection on Rose’s conception will force liberal egalitarians to 
confront some potentially explosive philosophical questions. These questions 
can be brought out by asking, first, how much free time people from different 
economic classes in fact have according to Rose’s conception, and, second, 
how much free time people belonging to different economic classes should 
have according to this conception. I will argue that asking these two questions 
will swiftly open up a Pandora’s Box in the liberal theory of social justice. What 
is at stake, at bottom, is how liberal philosophers, and other people committed 
to freedom and equality, should think about the persistence of class in modern 
society. It is a credit to Rose’s book that its pioneering discussion of free time 
will help to return this important matter to the foreground.
2. ROSE’S THEORY OF FREE TIME
The central claim of Rose’s book is that people have a claim to a fair share 
of free time. The reason, at bottom, is that people need free time in order 
to make meaningful use of their formal liberties and opportunities. For 
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example, if you have to work five days a week from morning till night as 
well as on weekends just to pay the rent and avoid eviction, then many of 
the most important liberties of citizenship will for this reason be rendered 
worthless to you. Forced to be at work at all hours on pain of losing your 
job, falling behind on the rent, and getting kicked out by your landlord, 
you will have little use for the freedom to engage in protest and peaceful 
assembly, to join a political or social organization, or to make other uses 
of the freedoms of speech, conscience, and association. More generally, 
in order to make effective use of the numerous legal freedoms you have as 
a citizen to pursue your personal projects whether alone or with others, 
you need not just the money but also the time away from work that is 
required to make some meaningful headway on your goals. It is no use 
signing up for a course in Spanish, for example, if there is simply no way 
you will be able to free up the time to attend the nightly classes and do 
the homework. The same goes for all of your other personal projects, from 
trivial to all-important, just as long you cannot advance these projects 
while you find yourself stuck at work. Yet surely, argues Rose, if it is of 
central importance to give everyone a range of formal rights and 
freedoms, then it must be centrally important that everyone be afforded 
the time to make some meaningful use of these freedoms as well. 
Accordingly, we ought to recognize that, as a matter of liberal justice, 
people have a claim to a fair share of free time. 
While the basic point may be straightforward, Rose argues persuasively 
that its significance for how we should think about distributive justice 
has been widely overlooked. The reason is that political theorists and 
economists alike have tended to conceive of free time as the inverse of 
the hours that people choose to spend in paid work. Owing in part to the 
grip of this standard view, it has been widely assumed that there is no 
need for the state to attend to the distribution of free time in order to 
secure distributive justice. Instead, the state’s proper role is said to be to 
maintain a system of fair wages, using familiar mechanisms such as taxes 
and transfers. Then, if a person wants more free time than he currently 
has, he can always choose to work fewer hours and earn less. 
The problem with this reasoning, argues Rose, is that the all-purpose 
resources of free time and income are not perfectly substitutable. This is 
true for at least three different reasons. The first is that labor markets are 
generally imperfect. At the prevailing hourly wage rates, many people 
would prefer to work fewer hours for a proportionately smaller take-home 
income. However, for various economic and non-economic reasons, most 
employers refuse to hire people part-time, and they routinely threaten to 
fire employees who do not show up for the full “nine-to-five.” As a result, 
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a substantial number of people find themselves in a condition that 
economists call over-employed, that is to say, willing to give up some 
proportional amount of their income for additional free time yet unable 
to do so without losing most or all of their labor incomes altogether. 
Second, there are some things that a person must do, such as being 
hooked up for hours to a dialysis machine, that require her presence and 
are therefore bound to consume her free time, regardless of whether she 
is provided with more income. In general, activities that are necessary to 
satisfy our basic biological needs – such as eating, sleeping, and exercising 
– are like this, and the minimum amount of time that must be spent on 
these activities in order to stay alive and healthy varies from person to 
person. Therefore, even when everyone has identical access to the exact 
same income, it will not normally be true that everyone is in a position to 
enjoy the same or even an adequate amount of free time, nor that giving 
people with unusually time-consuming bodily needs more money will 
always solve the problem. Sometimes, in order to have a minute to herself, 
what a person needs above all is someone’s help – and yet there is no 
guarantee that the requisite form of assistance will always be for hire. 
Finally, there is an even more basic reason why, from the point of view 
of most able adult citizens, income and free time are not perfectly 
substitutable. Namely, in societies like ours, the average person will 
eventually be allowed to go hungry and homeless unless she works for 
money, and therefore spending some of her waking hours earning a 
minimum income – at least enough to pay for the essentials – is something 
that the average person normally has to do, on pain of serious deprivation. 
Therefore, it is not true that for any level of income and any level of free 
time, a person can always straightforwardly increase her free time by 
quitting her job and earning less income. On the contrary, if she quits her 
reasonably well-paid job today, she may have to work even longer at some 
other, crummier job tomorrow. 
Moreover, because people differ dramatically in their qualifications 
and hourly earning potential, the time that different people must spend 
earning a minimally adequate income will likewise dramatically differ. 
Consequently, they will have different amounts of time left over to spend 
with their children, educate themselves, run for public office, and so on. 
Accordingly, as long as people are not required to enjoy identical earning 
potentials on other grounds of distributive justice, different people are 
bound to have access to different amounts of free time, and a question 
will arise as to whether social institutions have really provided each 
person with his or her fair share.
In her book, Rose argues that to appreciate these and other points, we 
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need to stop conceiving of free time as the chosen inverse of paid labor 
time. Instead, the free time that a person has on any given day is better 
understood as twenty-four hours minus the number of hours she must 
spend doing whatever is necessary to meet her basic needs, on pain of 
failing to satisfy her basic needs. In other words, the core of the politically 
relevant notion of free time is opposition to an idea of compulsion or 
necessity. A person’s free time is whatever time she is not compelled to 
spend doing things to meet her bodily, financial, and other basic needs, or 
the basic needs of her dependents – and hence time that is available for 
other purposes. According to Rose, it is free time in this distinct sense, of 
“time for what we will,” that should be recognized and treated as a distinct 
object of distributive justice. For without adequate free time in this sense, 
our formal liberties would end up being largely worthless to us.
Now, Rose suggests that reflection on her conception of free time 
provides a justification for extending familiar types of labor market and 
working-time regulation (Rose 2016: 135-45). For example, a generous 
minimum wage law can help to ensure that no one needs to work multiple 
jobs for a combined sixty hours a week simply to make the most basic ends 
meet. To the extent that a generous minimum wage law has this effect, it 
can be understood as a central means not only of giving the least well-paid 
workers more income and wealth, but also of giving each such worker 
(more of) his fair share of free time. Similarly, overtime regulations that 
prohibit employers from firing employees who refuse to work back-to-back 
shifts can be understood as a means of ensuring that each person is able to 
work no more than a set number of hours per day or per week, while still 
retaining access to an income sufficient to meet his basic needs, and 
thereby freeing him to take up other pursuits. Hence overtime regulations, 
too, look to be a tool that is normally essential to ensure that everyone will 
have access to his or her fair share of free time. In addition, Rose suggests 
that laws requiring companies to provide caregiver leave and flexible work 
schedules will normally be required to ensure that people with parental 
and other caregiving duties will be able to enjoy their fair share of free time 
as well. Finally, Rose argues that there may even be a case for requiring 
most businesses to shut down on Sundays. Otherwise, people whose 
employers require them to work on weekends are likely to lack a substantial 
amount of free time that is shared with, and can thus be coordinated and 
enjoyed with, a substantial number of others, including friends, neighbors, 
co-religionists and other possible associates. 
It turns out, however, that none of these general laws and regulations 
are recommended by reflection on Rose’s conception of free time. Instead, 
humane overtime regulations, mandatory caregiver leave, flexible work 
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schedules, and Sunday closing laws are plausibly necessary to give the 
least well-paid workers their fair shares of free time. However, such rules 
are far from necessary to liberate the seemingly harried affluent 
professionals who complain more than others about their impossible work 
hours. On the contrary, just in case some of the least well-paid workers 
today can be said to lack their fair shares of free time as well as their fair 
shares of income, this condition will normally imply that many affluent 
professionals should be constrained to work longer rather than shorter 
hours. In short, if we take seriously Rose’s idea of free time as a distinct 
object of distributive justice, then providing seemingly harried affluent 
professionals with the benefit of more humane overtime regulations, 
flexible work schedules, caregiver leave, and Sunday closing laws will turn 
out to be at cross-purposes with securing a just distribution of free time, 
and therefore with distributive justice more broadly.
3. WEALTHY PEOPLE ALREADY HAVE THEIR FAIR SHARES 
OF FREE TIME
According to Rose, how much free time a person has depends on how long 
she must personally work to have the benefit of an income that is sufficient 
to pay for the essentials. On this conception, then, a person’s free time 
evidently depends not only on the extent of her income-producing and 
salable wealth, but also on her maximum earning potential from labor, as 
well as on which of her ongoing expenses are to be regarded as essential or 
nonnegotiable. Imagine, then, a “house-rich” but “cash-poor” interior 
designer, who was once and might still be a well-paid corporate lawyer, 
with a large mortgage on an expensive house that is only half-way paid off, 
working long hours to save for residential college tuition for her three 
young sons. If it is not essential to have multiple guest bedrooms, work in a 
particular creative occupation, or spend half a million dollars on three 
times four years of residential college tuition, then the seemingly harried, 
single-parent interior designer will count as already having more than her 
fair share of free time. After all, she can ask her children to go to the local 
community college, sell the oversized house and multiple non-entry level 
cars, and perhaps even quit working altogether in her forties and live 
indefinitely off her savings, albeit on a much more modest consumption 
schedule than she and her children have enjoyed thus far. Alternatively, if 
she really does prefer to spend more than her accumulated wealth 
sustainably allows, she can return to earning much more per hour by 
practicing corporate law. From the point of view of the vast majority of 
workers today, these fallback options are nothing if not enviable. 
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Presumably, then, we should not say that the interior designer and her 
children would be deprived of the essentials just in case she gave up 
working fifty hour weeks in her existing niche occupation. 
However, if we admit this much concerning what she does and does not 
have to do to maintain a basic level of functioning for herself and for her 
children, then entire classes of seemingly overworked professionals will 
turn out not to need any new overtime regulations, parental leave policies, 
or flexible work schedules in order to enjoy their fair shares of free 
time.1After all, it will often be possible for college-educated and affluent 
professionals to transition to a noticeably less time-consuming role or 
occupation, sell some of their real and financial assets, reduce their 
expenses, or commit to some combination of these courses of action, 
without ever seriously risking the non-satisfaction of their basic needs or 
the basic needs of their dependents. Indeed, to the extent that they already 
possess substantial housing and financial wealth, by cutting out some of 
their non-essential expenses and “down-sizing” to a modest rental 
apartment in a less prime location, they may well never have to work for 
money again. 
Now, it seems reasonable to say that anyone in this enviable situation 
already has her fair share of free time. Where millions of others must work 
forty or more hours a week just to pay the rent and buy their clothing and 
food, a person with a fancy house in good repair and, say, an additional 
half a million dollars to her name does not have to work anywhere near the 
number of hours that she actually works, and, in truth, in order to enjoy a 
modest but steady income from accumulated property, she may no longer 
have to work at all. Presumably, then, it is not the case that public policy 
should enable such a person to maintain her existing class position at even 
less cost in time to herself, or what comes to the same thing, enable her to 
take even more time off from what would otherwise be tax-revenue 
generating employment at the public’s expense. 
Certainly, this is not what Rose’s theory of free time would seem to 
recommend. After all, for Rose the free time that any given affluent 
professional has is not to be understood as the inverse of the time that she 
actually spends working a paid job. Instead, the free time that a person has 
is the inverse of the time that she strictly has to work in order to meet her 
basic bodily and financial needs. So, if an already rich person without any 
1 There may of course be other reasons (for example, reasons of economic efficiency 
or political strategy) to include affluent professionals in a generally applicable working-time 
policy. However, if what I have said about the interior designer is correct so far, then a general 
policy will not be necessary to give affluent professionals their fair shares of free time. This 
is one of the main points that I will go on to elaborate in the text.
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unusual bodily needs could choose to live comfortably off her existing 
wealth, yet chooses to spend all of her waking hours getting even richer 
through lucrative paid work, then the enormous amount of time that she 
spends at the office for this purpose should not be thought to “detract from 
[her] free time, for it is still available to devote to any other end” (Rose 2016: 
42). On the contrary, it is precisely because she already has so much more 
wealth than other people that she must be understood to have far more 
free time as well: 
“To see this distinction, consider two individuals who spend all of 
their time engaged in the same types of activities for the same 
amounts of time: each spends twelve hours per day working for pay, 
eight hours sleeping, one hour eating, and so forth. The first is a 
wealthy heiress who could easily support herself with her investment 
income, though she actually chooses to spend a significant portion 
of her time working as a model. She is not contractually bound to 
work such long hours; every morning she receives a call from her 
agent asking if she would like to work that day and for how many 
hours, and she suffers no penalty if she chooses not to work. The 
second is a day laborer with no personal wealth who can command 
only low wages and so must work long hours to earn enough money 
just to get by. She is also not legally committed to working a certain 
number of hours: each day she is hired by a different person on an 
hourly basis for her day’s work.
Though both the heiress and the day laborer engage in the same 
number of hours of paid work, it is implausible to contend that both 
thereby have the same amount of free time. They both can choose, 
strictly speaking, whether or not to work on a given day, but the 
heiress’s paid work is discretionary in a way that the day laborer’s is 
not: the day laborer must work in order to attain a basic level of 
functioning, while the heiress need not... Even though the heiress 
does happen to spend her time engaged in paid work, the time she 
devotes to paid work is still available to her to pursue other ends if 
she so chooses. If, one day, she wishes to go to the beach instead of 
working, she possesses the free time to do so...” (Rose 2016: 42-43).
The reason that the heiress must be judged to have an unequaled 
amount of free time – even if she chooses to work sixty hour weeks and is 
therefore not “leisured” in that sense – is that the heiress but not the average 
worker is always “free not to devote her time to work,” because she is free to 
quit working without risking homelessness or the non-satisfaction of any 
other basic need. In other words, precisely because she owns an 
extraordinary amount of wealth – enough to live comfortably even without 
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having to work – she must for this reason be judged to have an extraordinary 
amount of free time as well. In Rose’s theory, this conclusion is simply a 
consequence of the way that free time has been defined. 
However, in this regard, the wealthy heiress who chooses to work long 
hours as a fashion model is just like any other affluent professional who 
has come into the possession of class-altering financial assets. Just like the 
wealthy heiress, the former corporate lawyer with a net worth of a million 
dollars is free to devote far less than fifty hours a week to paid work as an 
interior designer, without ever seriously risking having to sleep rough or 
facing material deprivation of any comparable kind. Indeed, the truth is 
that, like the heiress, the former corporate lawyer is already free to stop 
doing paid work altogether. For she already has enough wealth to maintain 
a comfortable life even if she quits her job and spends all of her weekdays 
at the beach instead.
However, if this is correct, then neither overtime regulations nor any 
sort of flexible working-time policy will be required to ensure that 
professionals who have managed to accumulate a liberating amount of 
wealth will be able to enjoy their fair shares of free time. For the very fact 
that they have accumulated enough wealth to live comfortably even 
without working entails that they already also enjoy an unparalleled 
amount of free time. Why, then, should affluent professionals be thought 
to have a claim in fairness to be provided with even more? Neither of the 
answers that a liberal egalitarian might give seem plausible in this context.
On the one hand, it will be implausible to say that wealthy professionals 
currently lack an adequate amount of free time. For, unlike the vast 
majority of workers, who really do have to work five days a week just to 
make ends meet, professionals who have a house and, say, half a million 
dollars in retirement accounts are already free to spend the entirety of 
their weekdays doing pretty much whatever they like. Like the heiress, 
most of them simply choose to use their free time to continue working and 
accumulating more wealth.
On the other hand, it would be even more implausible to say that affluent 
professionals lack their fair shares of free time because, while they each 
enjoy a fully adequate amount, they systematically have less of it than other 
workers have. For, as we have already seen above, this description is in fact 
the opposite of the truth. Precisely because they have been allowed to 
accumulate much more wealth, affluent professionals must be understood 
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to enjoy a much larger share of free time than almost anyone else.2 
Accordingly, it is hard to see why any new laws would be required to give 
affluent professionals their fair share of free time.
4. A UNIVERSAL FLEXIBLE WORK POLICY WOULD BE STRONGLY 
REGRESSIVE
I take it that for some readers this will not be a welcome result. Suppose, 
then, that in determining how long a given affluent professional must work 
to satisfy her basic needs, we deliberately disregard the types of facts outlined 
above. For example, suppose we say, with Rose (2016: 90-92), that each 
person is entitled to a fair share of free time in the occupation of her choice, so 
that if an interior designer with a middling full-time income could instead 
run a much more lucrative law practice part-time, this is to be regarded as 
irrelevant to the question of how many hours per month it is objectively 
necessary for her to be employed in order to pay her mortgage and cover all 
of her other bills. Similarly, suppose that we disregard the fact that she could 
sell one of her luxury cars and relocate to a much less expensive house, as 
well as the fact that she is among the one in seven Americans who was 
fortunate enough to inherit the equivalent of the median lifetime labor 
earnings of the bottom half of all workers3 – and that she could easily use 
some of this nest egg to cover the equivalent of the average family’s monthly 
housing and other expenses, without spending any time at all in paid work. 
If we disregard these types of facts, then even the most asset-rich and 
privileged professionals may well turn out not to have access to their fair 
shares of free time, just as long as the bosses in their chosen professions 
expect them to be at the office at all hours (because they pay them so 
handsomely for it). Against the background of such deliberate informational 
restrictions, however, the requirement that public policy must continually 
guarantee each person a fair share of free time will now turn out to be 
strongly economically regressive. 
For consider. If investment banks, elite law firms, and similar employers 
are ordered to give their highest-paid employees generous paid parental and 
2 Again, assuming no unusually time-consuming bodily needs, this conclusion 
follows straightforwardly from Rose’s conception of free time. On this conception, a person’s 
free time on any given day is simply twenty-four hours minus the number of hours that she 
has to work to be able to buy food, adequate shelter, and to meet all of her other basic bodily 
and financial needs. So, if someone already has enough wealth to live comfortably even 
without having to work, then, as long as she does not have unusually time-consuming bodily 
needs, she must be understood to have much more free time than the average person 
currently has.
3 
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caregiver leave, then, not being able to squeeze their costliest employees as 
much as before, the corporate profits of these employers are sure to erode, 
and, therefore, also the tax base for downwardly redistributive transfers, 
including wage subsidies for much poorer service-sector workers. Moreover, 
even if an exception is made for such elite employers, requiring them to 
guarantee only unpaid leave to their highest-paid employees, then the tax 
base is still likely to shrink. For when richly-paid yet harried professionals 
are guaranteed not to be fired for taking ample unpaid time off, we can 
expect that many will choose to spend fewer days and months in paid work, 
thereby generating that much less salary income that can be taxed by the 
state. And yet, with less tax revenue available for general government 
spending and redistributive programs, either some of the state’s spending 
will have to be cut or other – less well-paid – people will have to continue to 
work at least as much, if not more, than they currently do. 
In short, we have arrived at a dilemma. On the one hand, there is reason 
to affirm that each and every person has a claim to some substantial amount 
of free time. Presumably, then, affluent professionals who work for absurdly 
demanding bosses should be understood to have a claim to more humane 
overtime regulations, more flexible work schedules, and so on. However, in 
order to count such people as having to work at all (let alone as being forced 
to continue working at their current jobs), we must deliberately disregard 
not merely their spending habits but their existing housing and financial 
wealth. And yet if we decide to disregard their wealth, and if we then go on to 
provide (even) affluent professionals with more free time in the occupations 
of their choice, then the aim of continuously guaranteeing each person some 
reasonable amount of free time will turn out to be strongly economically 
regressive. For when harried corporate lawyers and investment bankers are 
suddenly rendered safe from being fired for refusing to work on weekends, 
many of these exceptionally well-paid professionals will undoubtedly 
choose to work less and thereby reduce the redistributive tax base. As a 
result, less revenue will be available to subsidize the wages – and therefore 
also the free-time – of workers who have decidedly less of both.
On the other hand, if we try to avoid this outcome by acknowledging a 
person’s wealth in the course of assessing what she does and does not have 
to do to meet her basic needs, then it will turn out that many highly-paid yet 
seemingly harried professionals will not need any new type of working-time 
regulations in order to count as enjoying a truly extraordinary amount of 
free time. The reason is that many of these people are already wealthy 
enough not to have to work anywhere near as long as they do. Indeed, many 
educated and affluent professionals could henceforth work strictly part-
time at more or less any minimum wage job, and could even drop out of the 
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paid labor force altogether for years at a time, without ever seriously risking 
the non-satisfaction of their own or their dependents’ basic needs. These are 
time-use possibilities that the vast majority of service-sector workers today 
can only dream of. Hence it seems that, if only we consider the time-use 
possibilities afforded by their wealth, many affluent professionals will have 
to be regarded as already having been blessed with a truly extraordinary 
amount of free time. However, if that is the case then it is difficult to see why, 
from the point of fairness, such persons should be entitled to even more free 
time at what will then be others’ expense.
5. CONCLUSION
As I have already hinted, the dilemma described in this essay emanates from 
a deeper question facing not merely Rose but also other egalitarian liberals. 
Namely, in a liberal society, the distribution of wealth and income is also a 
principal basis for distributing free time. People who are penniless are 
typically expected to work long hours in order to survive, whereas people 
who inherit or accumulate substantial wealth are free to spend their days 
however they like. As a result, the wealthy generally enjoy both more wealth 
as well as more free time. In a liberal society, are there other ways that 
freedom itself is tied up with economic class? This is the deeper question 
that rises to the surface on a close reading of Rose’s Free Time. 
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